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Abstract: In order to continue compulsory arbitration proceedings, an arbi-
tral tribunal should first determine whether it has jurisdiction over a dispute sub-
mitted to it for settlement. The legal provisions concerning the establishment of 
the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with the Annex VII 
(Arbitration) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, are scattered 
throughout Part XV and Annex VII of the Convention. Such provisions concern 
four aspects: the eligibility of subject, the eligibility of object, the major procedural 
requirements and the minor procedural requirements. When the arbitral tribunal 
attempts to determine that it has jurisdiction over a dispute, it should determine 
if any one of the four requirements is met in a definitive sense, thus making its 
contention logically and reasonably founded. To date, the existing practices with 
respect to the Annex VII arbitral tribunal’s establishment of its juris-diction or the 
statements of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea which demonstrate 
that the relevant arbitral tribunal has prima facie jurisdiction are, under most 
circumstances, problematic. Additionally, the parties to a dispute have the greatest 
controversies over the major procedural requirements, particularly whether the
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obligations under Article 283(1) of the Convention have been performed.
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I. Introduction
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter “UNCLOS” 
or “Convention”) entered into force in 1994. Since its inception, international 
arbitrations concerning maritime disputes have developed in a new direction: 
compulsory arbitration. Annex VII compulsory arbitration has been widely 
applied and has since become the primary method of maritime dispute settlement. 
Incomplete statistics show that, as of 31 December 2014, twenty-one maritime 
disputes have been or are being resolved through arbitration since the inception 
of the UNCLOS. Among them, eighteen disputes have been or are being resolved 
through compulsory arbitration, and seventeen disputes are filed in accordance with 
Annex VII of the UNCLOS.1 
Both international arbitration and judicature are legal methods for the 
settlement of maritime disputes; however, they are procedurally distinct, since 
international arbitration is based on mutual agreement, whereas international 
judicature is based upon statutory procedure. The wide application of compul-
sory arbitration leads to increasing instances of statutory procedure applied 
in international arbitration over maritime disputes, showing a tendency of 
judicialization. Except that the arbitration body and arbitrators are not fixed, 
the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, arbitral proceedings, applicable laws 
and other aspects are expressly stipulated, revealing increasingly consistent or 
similar stipulations with those within judicial mechanisms. Especially, a party 
may unilaterally institute an arbitral proceeding, preventing a party who is 
reluctant to participate in the arbitration from hampering the proceeding by raising 
1     See the seventeen arbitration cases instituted under Annex VII to the UNCLOS in the 
Schedule at the end of the text. The other one case is a compulsory arbitration instituted in 
accordance with the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-
East Atlantic.
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objections or by not responding. This is consistent with judicial procedures.2 
The fact that whether the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal can be constituted or 
not, is important to the party who is unwilling to or who cannot participate in a 
compulsory arbitration. Such is the case within the compulsory arbitration instituted 
by the Philippines regarding the South China Sea dispute as per Annex VII of the 
UNCLOS in January 2013.3
Considering the importance of determining the jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal, particularly its practical significance for China who is a party to the 
compulsory arbitration case over the South China Sea dispute, this paper will, 
based on the provisions of the UNCLOS and the practice in respect to compulsory 
arbitration, give a comprehensive analysis of the legal requirements that should be 
satisfied when determining the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal under Annex VII 
of the UNCLOS. 
II. Provisions Determining the Jurisdiction of the 
     Arbitral Tribunal under Annex VII of the UNCLOS
A. Fundamental Basis for the Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal 
    under Annex VII of the UNCLOS 
Article 288 of the UNCLOS sets out the basic stipulations for the jurisdiction 
of the tribunal. Article 288(1) provides that “[a] court or tribunal referred to in 
article 287 shall have jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation 
or  application of this Convention which is submitted to it in accordance with this 
Part.” Article 288(2) states that “[a] court or tribunal referred to in article 287 shall 
also have jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation or application 
of an international agreement related to the purposes of this Convention, which is 
submitted to it in accordance with the agreement.” Article 288(4) further stipulates 
that, “[i]n the event of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, 
2       The word “compulsory” is mentioned herein in a procedural sense. Substantially, the parties 
to a dispute remain free. Nevertheless, the fact that the procedure is instituted unilaterally 
by a party has radically changed the legal nature of arbitration, since the arbitration receives 
its name due to the agreement reached by the parties to institute such a procedure. This is 
the essential element distinguishing arbitration from judicial dispute settlement.
3     See the information relating to the dispute on the websites of Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1529, 31 December 2014.
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the matter shall be settled by decision of that court or tribunal.” Article 288(1) & 
(2) acts as the basic legal foundations for the establishment of the jurisdiction of 
an arbitral tribunal. Article 288(4) provides the basic legal grounds which allows 
the decisions of the arbitral tribunal to become binding upon any disputes over 
jurisdiction. 
In accordance with the above provisions, taking no account of the limitation 
found within Article 297 and the optional exceptions within Article 298 as well as 
other limitations or exceptions, the scope of the ratione personae of the arbitration 
under Annex VII includes States parties,4 provided that the State party: (a) chooses 
to settle a dispute through arbitration under Annex VII; (b) selects to settle a dispute 
through means other than the arbitration under Annex VII, but the means selected 
cannot be applied to the dispute; or (c) fails to choose the means for the settlement 
of disputes as per Article 287(1). The scope of the ratione materiae of the 
arbitration under Annex VII includes: (a) any dispute concerning the interpretation 
or application of the UNCLOS; or (b) any dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of an international agreement related to the purposes of the UNCLOS. 
B. Procedural Provisions Securing the Arbitral Tribunal’s Jurisdiction
    under Annex VII to the UNCLOS
In line with Part XV of the UNCLOS, apart from the basic legal grounds des-
cribed above, the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal may be based upon other proce-
dural legal provisions. Viewed from the legislative purpose of the articles and stipu-
lations of Part XV, these procedural provisions can be divided into two categories:
First, general provisions concerning the settlement of disputes, i.e. the 
provisions regarding whether a dispute can be settled in accordance with the 
compulsory procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV. Such provisions are 
primarily found within Articles 281, 282 and 283 under Section 1, Part XV, as well 
as Article 295 under Section 2, Part XV of the UNCLOS. Article 281 provides that 
the “settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice”, Article 282 
stipulates that a dispute shall “through a general, regional or bilateral agreement 
or otherwise” be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding decision, Article 
4     International organizations are allowed to access to the UNCLOS. And currently, the 
European Union is the only international organization which has accessed to the UNCLOS. 
“State parties” referred to herein generally mean all the parties to the UNCLOS. 
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283 states that the parties to the dispute shall proceed to “an exchange of views 
regarding its settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means”, and Article 295 
further provides that “local remedies have been exhausted where this is required 
by international law.” Among the four articles, Articles 281 and 282 are exclusive 
requirements (sometimes called “negative requirements”), that is to say, a dispute 
may not be submitted to the procedure under Section 2 under any circumstances 
described in any of the two articles. Articles 283 and 295 are essential requirements 
(sometimes called “positive requirements”), meaning that a dispute may be 
submitted to the procedure under Section 2 only when the conditions described in 
these articles are met. A dispute may neither be submitted to the procedure under 
Section 2 nor the arbitral proceeding under Annex VII as specified in Section 2, 
if any of the two exclusive requirements are satisfied or any of the two essential 
requirements are not met. These procedural provisions can be referred to as the 
major requirements for the determination of jurisdiction. 
Second, provisions concerning compulsory procedures, i.e. provisions 
stating, prima facie, that a dispute may be submitted to a procedure that entails 
a binding decision. Such provisions are embodied in Sections 2 and 3, Part XV 
of the UNCLOS, including Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Article 287, Paragraphs 2(a) 
and 3(a) of Article 297 and Article 298. Among them, the three paragraphs of 
Article 287 are essential requirements meaning that an arbitral tribunal may have 
jurisdiction only when one of the essential requirements is met. Paragraphs 2(a) 
and 3(a) of Article 297 and Article 298 are exclusive requirements, meaning that 
the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal may be challenged if any such requirements 
are satisfied. Paragraph 2(a) of Article 297 deals with any dispute with regard to 
marine scientific research arising out of “the exercise by the coastal State of a right 
or discretion in accordance with article 246”, or “a decision by the coastal State 
to order suspension or cessation of a research project in accordance with article 
253.” Paragraph 3(a) of Article 297 clearly applies to “any dispute relating to its 
sovereign rights with respect to the living resources in the exclusive economic zone 
or their exercise.” Article 298 stipulates that exceptions to an arbitral tribunal’s 
jurisdiction should be determined by the scope of disputes specified in the valid 
declaration made in accordance with this article. In line with Article 299(1), a dispute 
excluded under Articles 297 and 298 from the compulsory procedures “may be 
submitted to such procedures only by agreement of the parties to the dispute.” The 
procedural provisions stated above can be referred to as the minor requirements for 
the determination of jurisdiction. 
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C. Summary
In accordance with these and other provisions under Part XV of the UNCLOS, 
the legal requirements for securing the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal under 
Annex VII can be summarized into the following four criteria: (a) the eligibility of 
the subject, i.e. the parties to a dispute should be States parties to the UNCLOS; 
(b) the eligibility of the object, i.e. a dispute exists between parties, and the 
dispute submitted for arbitration must be a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of the UNCLOS or the interpretation or application of an international 
agreement related to the purposes of the UNCLOS; (c) two exclusive requirements 
among the major requirements are not met but two essential requirements are 
satisfied; and (d) any essential requirement amid the minor requirements is met and 
none of exclusive requirements is satisfied. 
An arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction cannot be established if any one of the 
requirements described above is not met. The following paragraphs will specifically 
analyze these four requirements, taking into consideration the arbitral practice in 
accordance with Annex VII of the UNCLOS. 
III. Legal Requirements for the Establishment of the
       Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal under Annex VII 
       of the UNCLOS: Four Requirements Theory
A. Eligibility of Subject: Ratione Personae 
In accordance with Article 287 of the UNCLOS, the party entitled to choose 
or participate in a procedure that entails a binding decision shall be a State party 
to the UNCLOS, which is not difficult to understand. The regime regarding the 
settlement of maritime disputes under Part XV of the UNCLOS, which is a kind 
of Convention-based dispute settlement mechanism, has its specific scope of 
ratione materiae. As it is stated in Article 291, unless the UNCLOS expressively 
stipulates that it is open to all parties, it is merely open to its States parties, which 
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is a right commonly enjoyed by States parties for the conclusion of a treaty.5 The 
States involved in maritime disputes account for only a small percentage of all 
States parties to the UNCLOS. With this in mind, the majority of maritime disputes 
can be resolved in accordance with the dispute settlement mechanisms within the 
UNCLOS, including arbitration under Annex VII. 
In practice, no dispute has arisen between parties in connection with the 
eligibility of a subject.6 To date, thirteen of the seventeen arbitration cases under 
Annex VII have been settled through various means, including handing cases 
over to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), by reaching an 
agreement between both parties and through arbitral decision.7 Publicly available 
statistical information shows that objection to an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction in 
accordance with compulsory arbitration under Annex VII occurred in all but two 
cases,8 the rate of objection currently stands at 88%.9 In spite of this, all parties 
to disputes are States parties to the UNCLOS, and they have yet to challenge the 
requirement that its dispute settlement procedures shall only be open to States 
parties. Generally, when an arbitral tribunal satisfies that it has jurisdiction, or the 
5       Article 291 of the UNCLOS (Access) provides that: 1. All the dispute settlement procedures 
specified in this Part shall be open to States Parties. 2. The dispute settlement procedures 
specified in this Part shall be open to entities other than States Parties only as specifically 
provided for in this Convention.
6        In practice, this requirement is of little practical significance. A party to a dispute is unlikely 
to resort to the dispute settlement means which it or the other party is not entitled to adopt. 
However, this remains theoretically possible. This is one reason why the arbitral tribunal or 
the ITLOS should first state this aspect, though such statements only concern some well-
known facts. Such statements become the point where the arbitral tribunal begins to satisfy 
itself that it has jurisdiction over a dispute or from which the ITLOS begins to demonstrate 
that the relevant arbitral tribunal has prima facie jurisdiction. 
7        Among them, four cases were decided by the arbitral tribunal (Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases,
Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Arbitration 
between Guyana and Suriname, and Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration 
(Bangladesh v. India)); four cases were terminated by agreement (The MOX Plant Case, 
Case concerning Land Reclamation, The “ARA Libertad” Arbitration, and Atlanto-
Scandian Herring Arbitration); five cases were transferred to the ITLOS (The M/V 
“SAIGA”Case, Swordfish Case, Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangladesh 
v. Myanmar), The M/V “Virginia G” Case, and Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Ghana v. 
Côte d’Ivoire)).
8      The two cases are the Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangladesh v. India) 
and the Atlanto-Scandian Herring Arbitration (the Kingdom of Denmark in respect of the 
Faroe Islands v. the European Union).
9     Both the respondent China in the South China Sea Arbitration and the respondent Russian 
Federation in The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration refused to take part in the relevant arbitration. 
Both respondents contended that the relevant arbitral tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction over the 
relevant dispute was the reason why they did not take part in the arbitrations.
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ITLOS grants the prima facie jurisdiction to an arbitral tribunal, it will first state 
that both parties to a dispute are States parties to the UNCLOS or have become 
States parties for a specific period of time before the dispute is submitted so as to 
demonstrate that the first legal requirement for the establishment of the jurisdiction 
of an arbitral tribunal has been met. 
B. Eligibility of Object: Ratione Materiae
First, we must determine if there is a dispute between the parties. The rationale 
behind this is that, since a party applies for compulsory arbitration it can be 
preliminarily determined that a dispute does exist between parties provided that the 
subject of the dispute is not fabricated. Therefore, in the practice of compulsory 
arbitration, there are typically few controversies over the fact whether there is a 
dispute. 
In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. 
Japan), Japan asserted that the disputes between Japan, New Zealand and Australia 
were scientific rather than legal under the UNCLOS.10 Nevertheless, this assertion 
was denied by the ITLOS. When determining the prima facie jurisdiction of 
the arbitral tribunal, the ITLOS maintained that the differences between Japan, 
New Zealand and Australia concerned points of law.11 Considering the judgment 
made by the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1924 and the judgment 
by the International Court of Justice in 1962, the ITLOS defined a dispute as a 
“disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests”,12 
and stated that it “must be shown that the claim of one party is positively opposed 
by the other.”13 Australia and New Zealand alleged that Japan had failed to comply 
with obligations under Articles 64 and 116~119 of the UNCLOS, with provisions 
of the 1993 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (hereinafter 
“1993 Convention”) and with rules of customary international law. Japan, however, 
denied that it had failed to comply with such provisions. For this reason, the dispute 
10   Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Request for 
Provisional Measures, Order, ITLOS, 27 August 1999, para. 42, at http://www.itlos.org/
fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_3_4/Order.27.08.99.E.pdf, 31 December 2014. 
[hereinafter “Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Order, ITLOS”]
11     Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Order, ITLOS, para. 43.
12     Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 11.
13     South West Africa, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 328.
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in question was determined to be legal.14 Later, the arbitral tribunal contended that 
there was a dispute between Japan, Australia and New Zealand.15
If the way in which the ITLOS handled the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases is 
considered as the standard in assessing the existence or absence of a dispute, then 
this obviously sets a relatively low standard which can easily be reached. In other 
words, this standard can be reached so long as a party expressly alleges that the 
other party has failed to comply with or perform its obligations under a legal article 
without any fabrication of facts. If the other party were to deny such allegations 
then it shows that both parties disagree on a point of law or fact. In instances where 
the other party admits such allegations it means that the party acknowledges the 
existence of a dispute between them. The question is then whether the controversy 
between the parties over the existence of a dispute may be considered as a dispute?
Second, not all disputes between parties are within the scope of ratione 
materiae in respect to arbitration under Annex VII. The disputes that may be settled 
through arbitration under Annex VII are specifically provided for in Article 288 of 
the UNCLOS. 
1. Disputes concerning the Interpretation or Application of the UNCLOS 
(Article 288, Paragraph 1)
What does “interpretation or application of the UNCLOS” imply? Some 
disputes are clear, for example, when the parties to a dispute explicitly state that 
they have a different idea concerning the interpretation or application of the 
provisions of the UNCLOS. However, under certain circumstances, the parties 
to a dispute may disagree as to the nature of the dispute itself. For example, one 
party may contend that the dispute concerns the interpretation or application of the 
UNCLOS, but the other party believes otherwise.
In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Japan raised its objection to the jurisdic-
tion of the arbitral tribunal by stating that even if its first claim (i.e., that disputes 
between Japan, New Zealand and Australia were not legal in nature) was denied, 
such disputes concerned the interpretation or implementation of the 1993 
14      Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Order, ITLOS, para. 45.
15      Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan), Award on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility, Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 4 August 2000, para. 47, at https://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewAnnouncePDF
&AnnouncementType=archive&AnnounceNo=7_10.pdf, 31 December 2014. [hereinafter 
“Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Arbitral Tribunal”]
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Convention and not the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS.16 Considering 
the fact that the 1993 Convention applied between the parties did not exclude their 
right to invoke the provisions of the UNCLOS in regard to southern bluefin tuna, 
the ITLOS rejected Japan’s objections.17 The arbitral tribunal also maintained that 
the disputes not only involved the 1993 Convention but also the interpretation or 
application of the UNCLOS.18
In the Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the 
Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Singapore, as the respondent, had neither 
challenged the fact that a dispute existed between the parties nor the fact whether 
the dispute, if any, concerned the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS, 
however it contended that the requirements of Article 283 of the UNCLOS had not 
been satisfied by directly invoking this article.19 The ITLOS contended that Article 
283 of the UNCLOS applied “[w]hen a dispute arises between States Parties 
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention”, and Singapore’s 
invoking of this article had implied that there was no disagreement between the 
parties that a dispute existed regarding the interpretation or application of the 
UNCLOS.20
In The “Ara Libertad” Case (Argentina v. Ghana), Ghana maintained that 
there was no dispute between Ghana and Argentina on the interpretation or 
application of the Convention.21 The ITLOS contended that it “does not need to 
establish definitively the existence of the rights claimed by Argentina and yet, 
before prescribing provisional measures, the Tribunal must satisfy itself that the 
provisions invoked by the Applicant appear prima facie to afford a basis on which 
the jurisdiction of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal might be founded.”22 After 
16    Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Order, ITLOS, para. 46.
17     Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Order, ITLOS, paras. 51~52.
18    Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Arbitral Tribunal, 
para. 52.
19   Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor 
(Malaysia v. Singapore), Request for Provisional Measures, Order, ITLOS, 8 October 
2003, paras. 33~34, at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_12/
Order.08.10.03.E.pdf, 31 December 2014. [hereinafter “Case concerning Land Reclamation, 
Order, ITLOS”]
20     Case concerning Land Reclamation, Order, ITLOS, paras. 35~36.
21    The “Ara Libertad” Case (Argentina v. Ghana), Request for the Prescription of Provisional 
Measures, Order, ITLOS, 15 December 2012, para. 51, at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/
itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/C20_Order_15.12.2012.corr.pdf, 31 December 2014. 
[hereinafter “The ‘Ara Libertad’ Case, Order, ITLOS”]
22     The “Ara Libertad” Case, Order, ITLOS, para. 60.
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analysis, the ITLOS contended that Article 32 of the UNCLOS concerned the 
subject matter of the disagreement,23 and therefore, “prima facie jurisdiction of the 
Annex VII arbitral tribunal” was founded.24
The three circumstances arose when the ITLOS was assessing the prima facie 
jurisdiction of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal. These practices reveal that, first, in 
the view of the ITLOS, any dispute concerning, partly or wholly, the interpretation 
or application of the UNCLOS, or at least the part concerning the same, shall be 
considered as a dispute provided for by the UNCLOS. The fact whether the dispute 
concerns the interpretation or application of other conventions will not prejudice 
the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal under the UNCLOS. As described above, the 
arbitral tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases held the same view. Second, it 
does not seem difficult to determine whether a dispute involves the interpretation 
or application of the UNCLOS. The ITLOS contends that this can be determined 
by looking at the Statement of the Claim and the Grounds on Which It Is Based 
(hereinafter “Statement of Claim”) attached to the notification submitted by the 
applicant to arbitration. In instances where the Statement of Claim expressly 
invokes the terms of the UNCLOS, and specifies that the dispute concerns the 
interpretation or application of such articles, the applicant’s words are acceptable, 
at least preliminarily, or can serve as prima facie evidence in respect to the dispute 
of interpretation or application of such articles, unless such words are apparently 
illogical or absurd. Certainly, the ITLOS merely satisfies that the arbitral tribunal 
has prima facie jurisdiction over a dispute. Then a question will arise as to whether 
the arbitral tribunal adopts such a loose standard to establish the final jurisdiction 
of its own? In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, the arbitral tribunal offered a 
negative answer by finally ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits of 
the dispute.25 Nevertheless, the subsequent practice of other arbitral tribunals under 
Annex VII is inconsistent with this case. 
2. Disputes concerning the Interpretation or Application of an International 
Agreement Related to the Purposes of the UNCLOS (Article 288, Paragraph 2)
In practice, some of the applicants’ claims do not concern the interpretation or 
application of the UNCLOS, but instead concern the interpretation or application of 
other international laws. In the Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, Guyana 
23      The “Ara Libertad” Case, Order, ITLOS, paras. 61~66.
24      The “Ara Libertad” Case, Order, ITLOS, para. 67.
25    Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Arbitral Tribunal, 
paras. 53~65.
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alleged that Suriname had violated the rules regarding the use of armed force 
under the Charter of the United Nations and general international law.26 Suriname 
objected to this allegation by stating that the arbitral tribunal had no jurisdiction to 
adjudicate such alleged violations.27 Ultimately, the tribunal determined that it had 
jurisdiction over the matter28 by virtue of Article 293(1) rather than Article 288(2) 
of the UNCLOS.29 In The “Ara Libertad” Case, Ghana maintained that an arbitral 
tribunal under Annex VII would not have jurisdiction over the interpretation or 
application of general international law.30 The ITLOS failed to respond directly to 
Ghana’s assertion.
It is noted that Article 288(2) grants a court or tribunal the jurisdiction over any 
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of an international agreement 
related to the purposes of the UNCLOS, however, all the relevant procedural 
provisions of Part XV specify that they apply to any “disputes concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention”, which seems to exclude the 
application of this paragraph. 
3. Statement of Claim: the Specific Scope of Disputes (Content)
Generally or procedurally, the scope of disputes under the jurisdiction of 
an arbitral tribunal is specified in Article 288 of the UNCLOS. Nevertheless, in 
case of a specific arbitration, not all disputes between the parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of the UNCLOS are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
arbitral tribunal. The disputes that are subject to its jurisdiction or the specific 
claims should be decided by the Notification submitted by the applicant to the 
tribunal and the Statement of Claim. On the other hand, the arbitral tribunal 
merely has the jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims concerning the interpretation 
or application of the UNCLOS and cannot adjudicate all the claims set forth in the 
Statement of Claim. Thus, the scope of the ratione materiae of the arbitral tribunal 
can be defined as the claims which concern the interpretation or application of the 
26    In the Matter of an Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, Award, Arbitral Tribunal 
Constituted Pursuant to Article 287, and in Accordance with Annex VII, of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 17 September 2007, para. 402, at http://www.
pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1147, 31 December 2014. [hereinafter “Arbitration 
between Guyana and Suriname, Award, Arbitral Tribunal”]
27     Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, Award, Arbitral Tribunal, para. 402.
28     Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, Award, Arbitral Tribunal, paras. 403~406.
29     The arbitral tribunal has invoked the wrong legal provision. Due to its little relevance to the 
topic herein, the paper will not elaborate it.
30     The “Ara Libertad” Case, Order, ITLOS, para. 58.
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UNCLOS specified in the applicant’s Statement of Claim.
With this in mind, the following can be concluded from the practice of the 
arbitral tribunal. In case of vague expressions in the Statement of Claim, the 
applicant may clarify its expressions in the subsequent procedures, provided that 
its basic position is consistent without any obvious or substantive changes. In the 
Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, at the 
proceedings, Barbados argued that the arbitral tribunal should award a fisheries 
access regime for Barbadian fishermen in the exclusive economic zone of Trinidad 
and Tobago which was an extra relief. Barbados contended that the tribunal should 
“have at its disposal a spectrum of remedies”, including such an access regime. If 
Barbados’ claim was not fulfilled, it may insist on its claim.31 Trinidad and Tobago 
challenged this claim by stating that Barbados had not put forward such a claim 
in any of its written pleadings.32 The tribunal finally decided that “it does not have 
jurisdiction to make an award establishing a right of access for Barbadian fishermen 
to flyingfish within the EEZ of Trinidad and Tobago,33 because that award is outside 
its jurisdiction by virtue of the limitation set out in UNCLOS Article 297(3)(a) and 
because, viewed in the context of the dispute over which the Tribunal does have 
jurisdiction, such an award would be ultra petita.”34
It follows that if an applicant redefines the scope of the dispute or makes 
new claims during the procedure, the arbitral tribunal, in principle, will not accept 
the claim since it is manifestly ultra petita. The wording “in principle” is used 
since an exception may exist theoretically, that is, the new claims made by the 
applicant may be accepted by the other party. Undoubtedly, in accordance with 
basic legal principles, such an acceptance should be expressly given. Then it can be 
understood that the parties to a dispute agree to submit a dispute that is ultra petita 
31    In the Matter of an Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 
Award, Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to Article 287, and in Accordance with 
Annex VII, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 11 April 2006, para. 
72, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1152, 31 December 2014. [hereinafter 
“Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Award, Arbitral 
Tribunal”]
32     Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Award, Arbitral 
Tribunal, para. 79.
33     This is the only case where it has been adjudicated that the arbitral tribunal constituted un-
der Annex VII does not have jurisdiction over the dispute, except for the Southern Bluefin 
Tuna Cases. 
34     Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Award, Arbitral 
Tribunal, para. 283.
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to the arbitral tribunal for compulsory arbitration, which constitutes a compulsory 
arbitration through agreement. In that case, the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction 
over the dispute. 
C. The Major Procedural Requirements
When the subject and object are determined to be eligible (i.e., when a dispute 
exists between the parties and the dispute concerns the interpretation or application 
of the UNCLOS), the major procedural requirements should then be examined. 
According to Article 286 of the UNCLOS, any dispute concerning its interpretation 
or application shall, “where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1 
(Part XV)”, be submitted to compulsory procedures under Section 2. As per Article 
288, the arbitral tribunal merely has jurisdiction over disputes which are submitted 
to it in accordance with Part XV. If a dispute cannot be referred to the procedures 
under Section 2, the arbitral tribunal surely has no jurisdiction over the dispute. 
As stated above, the major procedural requirements include two exclusive and two 
essential requirements. Both exclusive requirements should be unfulfilled, however 
the essential requirements should be satisfied. 
Among the other three sorts of requirements, the eligibility of subject and the 
minor procedural requirements primarily examine facts, involving relatively simple 
laws; the eligibility of object needs more but not demanding legal analysis, causing 
little controversy in practice. Comparing with them, major procedural requirements 
are the most complex with the widest range of examples in practice. 
1. Article 281, Paragraph 1: Exclusive Requirement #1
In accordance with this paragraph, if parties to a dispute “have agreed to 
seek settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice”, the 
procedures provided for in Part XV of the UNCLOS apply in two instances: (a) 
where no settlement has been reached by recourse to such means, and (b) when 
the agreement between the parties does not exclude any further procedure. The 
procedure provided for in Part XV, including the compulsory arbitration procedure, 
should not apply when the two conditions described above are not fulfilled.
Parties to a dispute may seek settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means 
of their own choice based on Article 280 of the UNCLOS, which states that 
“[n]othing in this Part impairs the right of any States Parties to agree at any time 
to settle a dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of 
this Convention by any peaceful means of their own choice.” It can be reasonably 
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deduced from Article 281(1) that the peaceful means chosen by the parties upon 
agreement should not include any legal procedures as specified in Part XV. This 
means that the parties may agree to fully exclude the application of compulsory 
procedures under Part XV, Section 2. Taking into account the provisions of Article 
282, such agreement should be provisional and an explicit or implicit agreement 
reached by the parties after the occurrence of the dispute, not in advance. 
Therefore, such agreement does not have universal relevance. In that case, whether 
the peaceful means of the parties’ own choice will lead to a binding decision is 
not specified. In the Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad 
and Tobago, the arbitral tribunal held the position described above. The tribunal 
contended that: 
Since it appears that Article 282 applies where the Parties have a standing 
bilateral or multilateral dispute settlement agreement which could cover the 
UNCLOS dispute which has arisen between them, it would appear that Article 
281 is intended primarily to cover the situation where the Parties have come 
to an ad hoc agreement as to the means to be adopted to settle the particular 
dispute which has arisen. Where they have done so, then their obligation to 
follow the procedures provided for in Part XV will arise where no settlement 
has been reached through recourse to the agreed means and where their 
agreement does not exclude any further procedure.35
The tribunal also argued that such an agreement did not have to be concluded in 
“any formal agreement”, since the de facto acts of both parties may imply such an 
agreement. In the present case the parties had agreed in practice “to seek to settle 
their dispute through negotiations.”36 The contentions of the tribunal in that case are 
not consistent with those of the arbitral tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases. 
In the cases, the tribunal defined the dispute settlement procedure under Article 16 
of the 1993 Convention as a “peaceful means of their own choice” stipulated by 
Article 281(1).37
35    Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Award, Arbitral 
Tribunal, para. 200(ii).
36    Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Award, Arbitral 
Tribunal, para. 200(ii).
37    Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Arbitral Tribunal, 
para. 55.
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Additionally, considering the requirement termed by the wording “at any 
time” under Article 280, the contentions of the arbitral tribunal in the Arbitration 
between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago are not fully inclusive. 
Such agreement should contain non-compulsory procedures specified in “a general, 
regional or bilateral agreement or otherwise” under Article 282. Both Articles 281 
and 282 fail to prescribe the forms of agreement reached by the parties. Article 
282 however, stipulates that “such dispute shall ... be submitted to a procedure that 
entails a binding decision,” showing the nature of the procedure. In other words, 
the fact whether it entails a binding decision may serve as the substantial, and 
sometimes only, standard to distinguish Articles 281 and 282. A more accurate 
understanding might be reached by referring to their travaux préparatoires. 
If one party38 alleges that both parties have agreed to seek dispute settlement 
through peaceful means of their choice, it should provide relevant evidence proving 
that both parties have reached such an agreement in an explicit or implicit way. The 
arbitral tribunal should determine whether such an agreement has been concluded 
by both parties, or, at least inquire about the information relating to each party. In 
the event that both parties fail to mention the existence of such an agreement the 
tribunal may then conclude that such an agreement does not exist. Nonetheless, for 
the sake of establishing jurisdiction, especially based on the provisions of Article 
9 of Annex VII of the UNCLOS, the tribunal should adopt a positive approach and 
determine whether such an agreement exists.39
In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Japan contended that Australia and New 
Zealand had not exhausted the procedures for amicable dispute settlement under 
Part XV, Section 1 of the UNCLOS, in particular Article 281, through negotiations 
or other agreed peaceful means, before submitting the disputes to a procedure 
under Part XV, Section 2 of the UNCLOS.40 In this case, the ITLOS claimed that 
the records showed that negotiations and consultations had taken place between 
the parties under the 1993 Convention as well as UNCLOS; that diplomatic notes 
38    Logically speaking, this party should be the respondent, otherwise, if the applicant is fully 
aware that both parties have reached such an agreement, it will not submit a request for 
arbitration. However, when the applicant misunderstands the situation, the request may also 
be used as a justified reason to withdraw its application. 
39     Article 9 of Annex VII to the UNCLOS (Default of appearance) stipulates that: If one of 
the parties to the dispute does not appear before the arbitral tribunal or fails to defend its 
case ... Before making its award, the arbitral tribunal must satisfy itself not only that it has 
jurisdiction over the dispute but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law.
40     Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Order, ITLOS, para. 56.
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revealed that these negotiations concerned the UNCLOS; and that Australia and 
New Zealand had stated that negotiations had been terminated.41 The ITLOS 
further pointed out that a State party was not obligated to pursue procedures under 
Part XV, Section 1 of the Convention when it concluded that the possibilities of 
settlement have been exhausted. In this connection, the ITLOS considered that 
the requirements for invoking the procedures under Part XV, Section 2 of the 
Convention had been fulfilled.42 The use of the phrase “no settlement has been 
reached by recourse to such negotiations” can be understood by referring to the 
Order of the ITLOS, which means that one party considers that the possibilities 
of settlement by peaceful means chosen by the parties have been exhausted. One 
cannot say that such a requirement is demanding. Within the Award, the arbitral 
tribunal expressed its position which was consistent with the ITLOS. Nevertheless, 
it adopted a more neutral tone towards the last contention of the ITLOS by stating 
that “this provision does not require the Parties to negotiate indefinitely while 
denying a Party the option of concluding, for purposes of both Articles 281(1) and 
283, that no settlement has been reached.”43
In the Case concerning Land Reclamation, Singapore attempted to invoke 
Article 281 of the UNCLOS.44 In this case, however, the ITLOS held that both 
Malaysia and Singapore agreed to settle the dispute between them through 
negotiations, provided that these negotiations would be without prejudice to 
Malaysia’s right to proceed with the arbitration pursuant to Annex VII of the 
Convention or to seek provisional measures. For this reason, the ITLOS decided 
that Article 281 of the Convention was not applicable in this case.45 The ITLOS 
considered the acts of both parties as agreement to settle the dispute through 
negotiations and the arbitration pursuant to Annex VII to the Convention or 
provisional measures. In this sense, the procedures above can be simultaneously 
applicable. Nonetheless, the application of the latter actually precludes the 
application of the former. In this regard, no legal foundation can be found in Part 
XV of the UNCLOS. In accordance with Article 281, both parties agreed to settle 
disputes through peaceful means other than those mechanisms found within Part 
41     Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Order, ITLOS, paras. 57~59.
42     Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Order, ITLOS, paras. 60~61.
43    Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Arbitral Tribunal, 
para. 55.
44      Case concerning Land Reclamation, Order, ITLOS, para. 53.
45      Case concerning Land Reclamation, Order, ITLOS, paras. 55~57.
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XV of the UNCLOS. It seems more reasonable to interpret the sentence “both 
parties agreed that these negotiations would be without prejudice to Malaysia’s 
right to proceed with the arbitration pursuant to Annex VII to the Convention or to 
seek provisional measures” as “the agreement between the parties does not exclude 
such a procedure.” In that case, a party may “proceed with the arbitration pursuant 
to Annex VII to the Convention or to seek provisional measures” only when the 
dispute cannot be resolved by negotiations. Concerning this, it is the author’s 
opinion that the ITLOS’s decision was incorrect. 
2. Article 282: Exclusive Requirement #2
Pursuant to Article 282, if parties to a dispute have agreed to submit the 
dispute “through a general, regional or bilateral agreement or otherwise”, to a 
procedure that entails a binding decision, the compulsory arbitration procedure 
should not be applicable. 
Based on the provisions of Article 281, “a general, regional or bilateral 
agreement or otherwise” may be concluded in advance or ex post facto with 
universal effect in any forms. Where such a procedure exists, even if the parties 
have chosen the procedure under Part XV, Section 2, the procedure should exclude 
the application of the procedure under Section 2, provided that the following two 
conditions are fulfilled: (a) such a procedure is the same as that found under Section 
2 which “entails a binding decision.” If such procedure is not compulsory, it may 
fall under the circumstance described by Article 281; (b) the dispute is submitted at 
the request of any party, and such request should be deemed explicit. 
Article 282 concludes with the sentence “the parties to the dispute otherwise 
agree”, referring to the circumstances indicated in Article 281. Under these circum-
stances, even if the parties to a dispute agree to settle the dispute through the pro-
cedure entailing a binding decision under Article 282, Article 281 should still 
exclude the application of Article 282, disregarding whether or not the agreement 
reached under Article 281 entails a binding decision. In that case, the standard 
differentiating Article 281 from Article 282 should be the fact whether “the parties 
to the dispute otherwise agree.” Articles 281, 282 and other procedures under Part 
XV are applied in a strict order and in an exclusive way, meaning that the latter 
provision shall be applied in the absence of the former circumstances. 
In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases Japan argued that recourse to arbitration 
under Annex VII was excluded because the 1993 Convention provided for a 
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dispute settlement procedure.46 Japan, however, failed to expressly state that it 
raised its argument by invoking Article 281 or 282. Australia and New Zealand 
opposed Japan’s argument by stating that they were not precluded from having 
recourse to the arbitration under Annex VII since the 1993 Convention did not 
provide for a compulsory dispute settlement procedure entailing a binding decision 
as required under Article 282 of the UNCLOS.47 The previous analysis indicates 
that Australia and New Zealand understood Article 282 correctly. Even though the 
1993 Convention provided for a procedure entailing a binding decision, Japan’s 
argument can also be rejected. The rationale behind is that neither Australia, New 
Zealand nor Japan had requested to initiate the dispute settlement procedure under 
the 1993 Convention. Nevertheless, as described above, the arbitral tribunal defined 
the dispute settlement procedure under the 1993 Convention as the “peaceful means 
of their own choice” provided for in Article 281(1) of the UNCLOS, which gave 
Japan’s argument a foundation. 
It should be noted that both the dispute under Article 281 and the one under 
Article 282 shall be the same dispute concerning the interpretation or application 
of the UNCLOS, otherwise they may not preclude the direct application of other 
procedures under Part XV. In The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), 
the United Kingdom maintained that Ireland was precluded from having recourse 
to an arbitral tribunal under Annex VII in view of Article 282 of the UNCLOS.48 
The reasons were as follows: Ireland had under Articles 32 and 9 of the 1992 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 
(hereinafter “OSPAR Convention”) submitted a dispute between Ireland and the 
United Kingdom to the OSPAR arbitral tribunal;49 certain aspects of the complaints 
of Ireland were governed by the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(hereinafter “EC Treaty”) or the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community (hereinafter “Euratom Treaty”) and the Directives issued thereunder, 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities shall have exclusive jurisdiction 
to resolve the relevant disputes.50 In addition, Ireland had made public its intention 
46     Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Order, ITLOS, para. 53.
47     Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Order, ITLOS, para. 54.
48     The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Request for provisional measures, Or-
der, ITLOS, 3 December 2001, para. 38, at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/
cases/case_no_10/Order.03.12.01.E.pdf, 31 December 2014. [hereinafter “The MOX Plant 
Case, Order, ITLOS”]
49      The MOX Plant Case, Order, ITLOS, paras. 39~40.
50      The MOX Plant Case, Order, ITLOS, para. 41.
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of initiating separate proceedings in respect of the United Kingdom’s alleged 
breach of obligations arising under these Treaties.51 For the above reasons, the 
United Kingdom maintained that the Annex VII arbitral tribunal would not have 
jurisdiction over the dispute.52 Considering that the dispute settlement procedure 
under the OSPAR Convention, the EC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty dealt with 
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of those agreements, and not 
with disputes arising under the UNCLOS, the ITLOS decided that Article 282 of 
the UNCLOS was not applicable.53
3. Article 283, Paragraph 1: Essential Requirement #1
Article 283(1) requires that the parties to a dispute “shall proceed expeditiously 
to an exchange of views regarding its settlement by negotiation or other peaceful 
means”, and no party shall submit the dispute to a compulsory arbitration procedure 
before the fulfillment of such obligation. This requirement has aroused so much 
controversy in practice that most of the decided cases have touched on it. 
First, the exchange of views by the parties is conducted for the purpose of 
determining the means (negotiation or other peaceful means) to settle the existing 
dispute, rather than seeking to settle the dispute through exchange of views. That is 
to say, exchange of views is not a means of dispute settlement. If the parties directly 
discussed the details concerning the settlement of dispute during their negotiations, 
can it be deemed that they have agreed on the means of dispute settlement? Second, 
the paragraph merely requires an exchange of views without specifying the extent 
of such exchange. When the obligation to exchange views may be considered as 
51     The MOX Plant Case, Order, ITLOS, para. 42.
52     The MOX Plant Case, Order, ITLOS, para. 44.
53   The MOX Plant Case, Order, ITLOS, paras. 48~53. It was the view of the ITLOS that 
Article 282 of the Convention was concerned with general, regional or bilateral agreements 
which provided for the settlement of disputes concerning “the interpretation or application 
of this Convention”. The dispute settlement mechanisms within the OSPAR Convention, 
the EC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty dealt with disputes concerning the interpretation 
or application of those agreements, and not with disputes arising under the Convention. 
Even if the OSPAR Convention, the EC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty contained rights or 
obligations similar to or identical with the rights or obligations set out in the Convention, 
the rights and obligations under those agreements had a separate existence from those under 
the Convention; the application of international law rules on interpretation of treaties to 
identical or similar provisions of different treaties may not yield the same results, having 
regard to, inter alia, differences in the respective contexts, objects and purposes, subsequent 
practice of parties and travaux préparatoires. Since the dispute before the Annex VII 
arbitral tribunal concerned the interpretation or application of the Convention and no other 
agreement, only the dispute settlement procedures under the Convention were relevant to 
that dispute.
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performed is to be assessed in practice. Third, the obligation to exchange views 
shall proceed expeditiously.
In The MOX Plant Case, the United Kingdom contended that the requirements 
of Article 283 had not been satisfied since, in its view, there had been no exchange 
of views regarding the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or other peaceful 
means.54 Ireland argued that in its letter written as early as 30 July 1999, it had 
drawn the United Kingdom’s attention to the dispute under the UNCLOS and 
that further exchange of correspondence concerning this issue took place up to 
the submission of the dispute to the Annex VII arbitral tribunal.55 Furthermore, 
Ireland contended that it had submitted the dispute to the arbitral tribunal only after 
the United Kingdom failed to indicate its willingness to consider the immediate 
suspension of the authorization of the MOX plant and a halt to related international 
transports.56 In the view of the ITLOS, a State party was not obliged to continue 
to exchange views when it had concluded that the possibilities of reaching an 
agreement regarding the settlement of a dispute by peaceful means had been 
exhausted.57 This example illustrates that the requirement regarding the exchange 
of views is not difficult to satisfy, since it may be satisfied as long as there is 
evidence (the correspondences between the parties are the most accessible and 
simplest evidences), in form or otherwise, proving that both parties have exchanged 
views concerning the settlement of dispute through negotiation or other peaceful 
means. The extent of exchange of views is not specified, which should be decided 
by any party to a dispute at its own discretion. The party merely has to conclude 
that the possibilities of reaching agreement had been exhausted. In other words, 
this provision fails to obligate parties to a dispute to exhaust all possible diplomatic 
means. Additionally, neither the tribunal nor the parties have indicated the meaning 
of “expeditiously.”
In the Case concerning Land Reclamation, Singapore contended that the re-
quirements of Article 283 of the UNCLOS had not been satisfied since, in its view, 
there had been no “exchange of views regarding the settlement of the dispute 
by negotiation or other peaceful means”, and that Article 283 made negotiations 
between the parties “a precondition to the activation of Part XV compulsory dispute 
54     The MOX Plant Case, Order, ITLOS, para. 54.
55     The MOX Plant Case, Order, ITLOS, para. 58.
56     The MOX Plant Case, Order, ITLOS, para. 59.
57     The MOX Plant Case, Order, ITLOS, para. 60.
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settlement procedures.”58 After reviewing the discussions and negotiations between 
the parties as well as the relevant decisions previously delivered by the ITLOS, the 
ITLOS held that “a State Party is not obliged to pursue procedures under Part XV, 
section 1, of the Convention when it concludes that the possibilities of settlement 
have been exhausted”, and that “a State Party is not obliged to continue with an 
exchange of views when it concludes that the possibilities of reaching agreement 
have been exhausted.”59 For these reasons, the ITLOS believed that, in this case, 
the requirement of Article 283 was satisfied. In order to respond to Singapore’s 
consideration of Article 283 as a precondition, the ITLOS invoked the statement 
made by the International Court of Justice in the Case concerning the Land and 
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), which 
reads, “[n]either in the Charter nor otherwise in international law is any general rule 
to be found to the effect that the exhaustion of diplomatic negotiations constitutes 
a precondition for a matter to be referred to the Court.”60 It failed, however, to 
directly respond to or reject Singapore’s contention. 
The arbitral tribunals in the Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic 
of Trinidad and Tobago61 and the Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname,62 and 
the ITLOS in The “Ara Libertad” Case,63 handled the obligation to exchange views 
under Article 283 following the decisions of the above two cases. Specifically, the 
arbitral tribunals or the ITLOS reviewed the negotiations and communications 
between the parties regarding the means to settle the dispute including diplomatic 
notes, documents, correspondences and personnel exchanges, and indicated 
that both parties had exchanged views. The tribunals did not overemphasize the 
content of the exchange. In some cases, such exchanges directly involve the claims 
of a party, whereas in other cases they only mention certain aspects relevant to 
the dispute in a general way, without specifying the dispute or the claims. The 
arbitral tribunals or the ITLOS then demonstrated that the parties had fulfilled the 
obligation under Article 283 by invoking the “golden rule” initially proposed by 
the ITLOS in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases and improved in The MOX Plant 
58     Case concerning Land Reclamation, Order, ITLOS, paras. 33~34.
59     Case concerning Land Reclamation, Order, ITLOS, para. 47.
60   Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria 
(Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 303
61     Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Award, Arbitral 
Tribunal, paras. 201~203.
62      Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, Award, Arbitral Tribunal, paras. 408~410.
63      The “Ara Libertad” Case, Order, ITLOS, paras. 69~72.
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Case, primarily that “a State Party is not obliged to continue with an exchange of 
views when it concludes that the possibilities of reaching agreement have been 
exhausted.”64 We have not found any circumstance where this requirement has, in 
practice, been unsatisfied. The arbitral tribunal failed to explicitly state whether a 
party’s judgment was based on an objective or subjective standard, perhaps because 
these cases were not so complex. However, practices reveal that such judgment 
may mainly depend on the parties’ subjective evaluation, along with certain 
objective facts.  
4. Article 295: Essential Requirement #2
Article 295 of the UNCLOS stipulates that any dispute may be submitted to 
the compulsory procedures provided for in Section 2 only after local remedies have 
been exhausted where this is required by international law. This article falls under 
Part XV, Section 2, however, for proceedings, it is a major procedural requirement. 
Specifically, the requirement that “local remedies have been exhausted” refers 
to two things: (a) that the rule would apply only in a dispute relating to a claim 
by a private person which had the nationality of one State Party against another 
State Party; (b) that in no case would this provision apply to disputes in which a 
private party was not involved, as one State could not be asked to submit to courts 
of another State in a purely interstate dispute.65 In accordance with Article 287 of 
the UNCLOS, only the States parties to the UNCLOS may choose or participate 
in the compulsory procedure which entails a binding decision, excluding any 
private entity, which actually precludes Article 295 from applying to compulsory 
arbitration. Therefore, Article 295 is a false requirement for the establishment of the 
jurisdiction in compulsory arbitration. That is why the arbitral tribunal, the ITLOS 
or the parties to a dispute have not mentioned this article in the Annex VII arbitral 
practice. 
D. The Minor Procedural Requirements
In principle, States parties have the right to invoke dispute settlement proce-
dures under Part XV of the UNCLOS (such as the provisions found within Sections 
1 and 2), however, this right is not unlimited. This right ought to be restricted by 
64      The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Order, ITLOS, para. 60; The MOX Plant Case, Order, 
ITLOS, para. 60.
65   Myron H. Nordquist ed., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A 
Commentary, Vol. V, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989, p. 81.
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provisions which reduce or limit their right (such as the provisions within Section 
3). The requirements in this respect include one essential requirement and two 
exclusive requirements. The minor procedural requirements may be satisfied only 
when the essential requirement is fulfilled and none of the exclusive requirements 
is fulfilled. 
1. Article 287: Essential Requirement
This requirement aims to determine whether the eligible subject has accepted 
or is deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex VII. It involves 
three circumstances. When any of the three are satisfied, it will be considered that 
the essential requirement is met, showing that the eligible subject has accepted 
or is deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex VII. These 
three circumstances are based on whether a declaration in force has been made in 
accordance with Article 287, Paragraph 1 and include: (a) a party to a dispute is not 
covered by a declaration in force (Paragraph 3); (b) the parties to a dispute have 
each accepted the arbitration in accordance with Annex VII for the settlement of 
the dispute, unless the parties otherwise agree (Paragraph 4); or (c) the parties to 
a dispute have not accepted the same procedure for the settlement of the dispute, 
unless the parties otherwise agree (Paragraph 5).
In practice, an instance where the parties to a dispute have each accepted 
the arbitration in accordance with Annex VII for the settlement of the dispute has 
never occurred. However, in some cases the parties to a dispute did not choose 
the means to settle their dispute in accordance with Article 287(1). For instance, 
in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, the Case concerning Land Reclamation and 
the two cases concerning the delimitation of maritime boundaries, the arbitral 
tribunal or the ITLOS categorized the circumstances under Paragraph 3, i.e., that 
these parties were not covered by existing declarations in force. In the South China 
Sea Arbitration (the Philippines v. China), neither party made any choices in 
accordance with Article 287, which is logically associated with the circumstance 
discussed above. Nevertheless, in the Rules of Procedure, the arbitral tribunal 
categorized this case into the circumstance described in Paragraph 5.66 In the Bay of 
Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangladesh v. India), India did not choose; 
pursuant to Article 287 of the UNCLOS, Bangladesh, the applicant, declared 
66   In the Matter of an Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII 
to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of 
the Philippines (Applicant) and the People’s Republic of China (Respondent), Rules of 
Procedure, Arbitral Tribunal, 27 August 2013.
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on 14 December 2009 that it had accepted the jurisdiction of the ITLOS for the 
settlement of dispute between them relating to the delimitation of their maritime 
boundary in the Bay of Bengal.67 However, considering that Bangladesh had failed 
to choose when the arbitration was initiated on 8 October 2009, this case should be 
discussed in relation to the circumstances described in Paragraph 3. Nevertheless, 
in the Rules of Procedure, the arbitral tribunal also categorized the case between 
Bangladesh and India into the circumstances described in Paragraph 5. If the failure 
to make any choice by a party is deemed as a negative choice, then such a case 
may fall under the circumstances specified in Paragraph 5. In other words, a party 
to a dispute has made a choice without specifying the means to settle the dispute 
due to its negative choice. With this in mind, both parties to the dispute cannot be 
considered as having chosen the same procedure for the settlement of that dispute. 
In this way, we can better understand the arbitral tribunal’s decisions in the two 
cases. 
Apart from the two cases stated above, most of the cases are applicable to the 
circumstances described in Paragraph 5. For example, in The MOX Plant Case, 
Ireland, the applicant, failed to make a choice for the settlement of dispute in 
accordance with Article 287(1). However, in January 1998, the United Kingdom, 
the respondent, chose the International Court of Justice as its first preference for 
the settlement of the dispute.68 In the MPA Case (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), 
Mauritius, the applicant, also failed to make any choice, however the United 
Kingdom did. In The “Ara Libertad” Case, when Argentina, the applicant, ratified 
the UNCLOS in December 1995, it chose the ITLOS as its first preference and 
the Annex VIII special arbitration as its second preference for dispute settlement 
(subject to the scope of jurisdiction).69 Although Ghana, the respondent ratified the 
UNCLOS in June 1983, it has not chosen its preferred method of dispute settlement 
67    Pursuant to Article 287, Paragraph 1 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh declares that it accepts the 
jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for the settlement of dispute 
between the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the Republic of India relating to the 
delimitation of their maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal, at http://www.un.org/Depts/
los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#Bangladesh Upon ratification, 31 
December 2014.
68     At http://www.un.org/Depts/los/settlement_of_disputes/choice_procedure.htm, 31 Decem-
ber 2014.
69     At http://www.un.org/Depts/los/settlement_of_disputes/choice_procedure.htm, 31 Decem-
ber 2014.
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until now.70 In The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. 
Russian Federation), when the Netherlands, the applicant, ratified the UNCLOS 
in June 1996, it chose the International Court of Justice as its first preference for 
dispute settlement.71 The respondent, the Russian Federation, adopted the choice 
made by the former Soviet Union in December 1982 when it ratified the UNCLOS, 
i.e. it chose Annex VII arbitration as its first preference and Annex VIII special 
arbitration as its second preference for the settlement of disputes (subject to the 
scope of jurisdiction).72 In line with Article 287(5), all parties involved in these 
cases “have not accepted the same procedure for the settlement of the dispute”, 
therefore they should be deemed as accepting jurisdiction in accordance with 
Annex VII arbitration. 
2. Article 298: Exclusive Requirement #1
Article 298 is entitled “Optional exceptions to applicability of section 2.” 
The part specific to Annex VII arbitration is that: if a party to a dispute, pursuant 
to Article 298(1), declares in writing that it does not accept the compulsory 
procedures or compulsory arbitral procedures with respect to the dispute, the party 
shall be deemed as having waived its right to submit the dispute to the Annex 
VII arbitration. In accordance with Article 298(3), a party which has made such a 
declaration shall not be entitled to submit any dispute covered by the declaration 
to the compulsory procedure as against another party, without the consent of that 
party. If this requirement is met then the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction 
over the dispute. 
Until now, we have found three cases which have invoked Article 298. In 
The “Ara Libertad” Case, both parties declared, pursuant to Article 298(1) of the 
UNCLOS, that they did not accept the compulsory procedure entailing a binding 
decision with respect to the dispute between them. On 15 December 2009, Ghana 
declared that it “does not accept any of the procedures provided in section 2 of 
Part XV of the Convention with respect to the categories of disputes referred to in 
paragraph 1(a) of article 298 of the Convention.”73 However, the dispute involved 
70     At http://www.un.org/Depts/los/settlement_of_disputes/choice_procedure.htm, 31 Decem-
ber 2014.
71     At http://www.un.org/Depts/los/settlement_of_disputes/choice_procedure.htm, 31 Decem-
ber 2014.
72     At http://www.un.org/Depts/los/settlement_of_disputes/choice_procedure.htm, 31 Decem-
ber 2014.
73     At http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI~6&ch
apter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en#EndDec, 31 December 2014.
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in this case does not fall within the categories of disputes referred to in Paragraph 
1(a) of Article 298 of the UNCLOS as stated in the declaration, which therefore 
does not exclude the parties to a dispute from accepting Annex VII arbitration. 
When Argentina ratified the UNCLOS in 1995, it declared that “it does not accept 
the procedures provided for in Part XV, section 2 with respect to the disputes 
specified in article 298, paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c).”74 However, the dispute referred 
to in this case is one of the “disputes concerning military activities, including 
military activities by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial 
service”, as specified in Article 298, Paragraph 1(b) of the UNCLOS. It can be 
concluded that Argentina’s declaration, pursuant to Article 298 in 1995, precluded 
the dispute from submitting to Annex VII. Nonetheless, after the ship was detained, 
on 26 October 2012, the fourth day before Argentina officially initiated the Annex 
VII arbitration, Argentina made its second declaration pursuant to Article 298.75 In 
accordance with Article 298(2) of the Convention, Argentina withdrew the decla-
ration it made in 1995, which stated that “military activities by government vessels 
and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service” did not accept any procedures 
specified in Part XV, Section 2, of the UNCLOS. This act has cleared obstacles for 
the Annex VII arbitral tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute involved in 
this case. 
The respondents China and Russian Federation, in the South China Sea 
Arbitration and The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration, both made declarations under 
Article 298 of the UNCLOS, and refused to participate in arbitral procedures 
mainly on ground of such declarations. China failed to make any declaration in 
writing when it ratified the UNCLOS in 1996. However, ten years thereafter, 
China submitted its declaration under Article 298 to the United Nations Secretary-
General on 25 August 2006, stating that it did not accept any of the procedures 
entailing binding decisions provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the UNCLOS 
with respect to the three categories of disputes referred to in Paragraph 1 of Article 
74   At http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.
htm#Argentina Upon ratification, 31 December 2014.
75     In accordance with article 298 of [the] Convention, the Argentine Republic withdraws with 
immediate effect the optional exceptions to the applicability of section 2 of part XV of the 
Convention provided for in that article and set forth in its declaration dated 18 October 
1995 (deposited on 1 December 1995) to “military activities by government vessels and 
aircraft engaged in non-commercial service”, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_
agreements/convention_declarations.htm#Argentina Upon signature, 31 December 2014.
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298.76 This declaration surely applies to the compulsory arbitration proceedings 
under Annex VII. 
In the South China Sea Arbitration, the Philippines, in its Statement of 
Claim, asserted that the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction to hear and make an 
award because its claims were not with respect to the three categories of disputes 
referred to in Paragraph 1 of Article 298, and thus were not covered in China’s 
Declaration of 2006 under Article 298 of the UNCLOS.77 China contended that 
the matters submitted by the Philippines to arbitration “essentially concerned 
with maritime delimitation between the two countries in parts of the South 
China Sea”, and China’s Declaration under Article 298 had excluded “disputes 
regarding such matters as those related to maritime delimitation from compulsory 
dispute settlement procedures, including arbitration”.78 In the Position Paper of 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction 
in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, 
China further refined its contention by stating that “even assuming, arguendo, 
that the subject-matter of the arbitration were concerned with the interpretation or 
application of the Convention, that subject-matter would still be an integral part of 
maritime delimitation and, having been excluded by the 2006 Declaration filed by 
China, could not be submitted for arbitration”.79
When the Russian Federation ratified the UNCLOS in 12 March 1997, it chose 
Annex VII arbitration as its first preference for the settlement of disputes pursuant 
to Article 287 of the UNCLOS, however, it also made a declaration under Article 
76    The Government of the People’s Republic of China does not accept any of the procedures 
provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all the categories of 
disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a) (b) and (c) of Article 298 of the Convention, at http://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI~6&chapter=21
&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en#EndDec, 25 February 2015.
77     At http://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/unclos/216-sfa-statement-on-the-
unclos-arbitral-proceedings-against-china, 25 February 2015.
78   At At http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/
t1035577.shtml, 25 February 2015.
79   Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Position Paper of the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South 
China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, paras. 57~75, at http://
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1217147.shtml, 25 February 
2015.
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298.80 Unlike China, who used the general expression that “all the categories of 
disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a) (b) and (c) of Article 298” in its declaration 
under Article 298, the Russian Federation enumerated all the disputes in its 
declaration basically in the order that the three categories of disputes referred to in 
Paragraph 1 are arranged. The only difference is that Russia replaced the statement 
“disputes concerning law enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal 
under article 297, paragraph 2 or 3” with the expression “disputes concerning law-
enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction”. 
The legal effect of such a difference is that it has left room for interpretation in 
practice. In The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration, the Russian Federation stated that the 
dispute concerned “the exercise of its jurisdiction … in order to enforce laws and 
regulations of the Russian Federation as a coastal State in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”,81 and 
further stated that it had excluded such a category of dispute from the application 
of Part XV, Section 2 of the UNCLOS as per Article 298. The ITLOS, in its Order 
concerning provisional measures, asserted that the dispute defined by the Russian 
Federation with respect to law enforcement activities under Article 298, Paragraph 
1(b), of the Convention prima facie applied only to “disputes excluded from 
the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal under article 297, paragraph 2 or 3, of the 
Convention”.82 However, the ITLOS failed to give any further analysis.83
The arbitral tribunal established thereafter released an Award on Jurisdiction 
80    The Russian Federation declares that, in accordance with article 298 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, it does not accept the procedures, provided for in 
section 2 of Part XV of the Convention, entailing binding decisions with respect to disputes 
concerning the interpretation or application of Articles 15, 74 and 83 of the Convention, 
relating to sea boundary delimitations, or those involving historic bays or titles; disputes 
concerning military activities, including military activities by government vessels and 
aircraft, and disputes concerning law-enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction; and disputes in respect of which the Security Council of 
the United Nations is exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter of the United 
Nations, at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=X
XI~6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en#EndDec, 25 February 2015.
81     The “Arctic Sunrise” Case (The Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Russian Federation), 
Request for Provisional Measures, Order, ITLOS, 22 November 2013, para. 65, at http://
www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Order/C22_Ord_22_11_2013_
orig_Eng.pdf. [hereinafter “The ‘Arctic Sunrise’ Case, Order, ITLOS”]
82       The “Arctic Sunrise” Case, Order, ITLOS, para. 45.
83       Such an act of the ITLOS has been criticized by some judges such as Judge Jesus. 
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with regard to Russia’s position described above.84 The arbitral tribunal contended 
that despite the ambiguity in the declaration under Article 298 made by the Russia 
Federation, it was ascertainable that the disputes excluded in the declaration were 
only “disputes … excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal under article 
297, paragraph 2 or 3, of the Convention”.85 Nevertheless, the dispute involved in 
the present case did not fall under such a category of dispute; thus, the declaration 
should not exclude the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.86
It should be noted that “these exceptions are not self-judging, and their 
applicability in a particular case cannot be determined by their invocation by the 
State party against which a complaint is brought”.87 Disregarding whether the 
declaration under Article 298 made by any party has excluded some disputes from 
the application to Annex VII arbitration or excluded the jurisdiction of the relevant 
arbitral tribunal, in accordance with Article 288(4) of the UNCLOS, the matter 
shall be settled by decision of the arbitral tribunal. In this connection, it seems that 
the only argument that a party has made a declaration under Article 298 excluding 
the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction over the matter concerned would not be sufficient 
to support its refusal to take part in any arbitral procedures.
3. Article 297, Paragraphs 2(a) and 3(a): Exclusive Requirement #2
As mentioned above, these paragraphs of Article 297 apply to particular 
subjects and disputes. Paragraph 2(a) only applies to disputes in regard to marine 
scientific research arising out of “the exercise by the coastal State of a right or 
discretion in accordance with article 246” or “a decision by the coastal State to 
order suspension or cessation of a research project in accordance with article 253.” 
Paragraph 3(a) only applies to disputes relating to the coastal State’s “sovereign 
rights with respect to the living resources in the exclusive economic zone or their 
exercise.” The coastal State shall not be obliged to accept the submission of such 
disputes to compulsory arbitration. Different from Article 298, which is also an 
exclusive requirement, the refusal to accept within Article 297 does not need to be 
declared in advance but must be explicitly stated during the proceedings. 
84    In the Matter of the Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (The Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
Russian Federation), Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitral Tribunal, 26 November 2014, at http://
www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1556, 25 February 2015. [hereinafter “The Arctic 
Sunrise Arbitration, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitral Tribunal”]
85     The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitral Tribunal, para. 75.
86     The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitral Tribunal, paras. 72~78.
87    Myron H. Nordquist ed., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A 
Commentary, Vol. V, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989, p. 140.
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In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, despite the fact that the parties did 
not mention Article 297 of the UNCLOS, the arbitral tribunal contended that 
this article was “of particular importance” in the establishment of the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction, hence it stated Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this article in a plain and 
general manner.88 In practice, there are two cases which specifically involve the 
application of Article 297, Paragraph 3(a). In the Arbitration between Barbados 
and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, the arbitral tribunal maintained that the 
question of jurisdiction over an access claim was determined by Article 297(3) 
of the UNCLOS.89 Trinidad and Tobago had made plain that it did not consent to 
the decision of such a dispute by the arbitral tribunal.90 The tribunal accordingly 
decided that it did not have jurisdiction to make an award over this claim.91 In the 
Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, Suriname attempted to challenge the 
arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction by invoking Article 297 and alleging that Guyana’s 
submission was a dispute concerning a coastal State’s enforcement of its sovereign 
rights with respect to non-living resources.92 The tribunal contended that any 
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS which was 
not excluded by the operation of Part XV, Section 3 (Articles 297 and 298) fell 
under the compulsory procedures in Section 2. Article 297, Paragraph 3(a) was 
relevant to the case,93 but sovereign rights over non-living resources did not fall 
under this exception.94 The tribunal was “therefore unable to entertain Suriname’s 
argument.”95
When deciding whether the requirement is satisfied, we only have to assess 
whether the subject and dispute have met the relevant provisions, which is not 
demanding. 
88   Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Arbitral Tribunal, 
para. 61.
89    Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Award, Arbitral 
Tribunal, para. 216.
90    Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Award, Arbitral 
Tribunal, para. 276.
91    Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Award, Arbitral 
Tribunal, para. 283.
92     Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, Award, Arbitral Tribunal, para. 412.
93     Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, Award, Arbitral Tribunal, para. 414.
94     Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, Award, Arbitral Tribunal, para. 415.
95     Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, Award, Arbitral Tribunal, para. 416.
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IV. Concluding Remarks
So far seventeen cases in total have been submitted for compulsory arbitration 
in accordance with Annex VII of the UNCLOS, among which thirteen cases have 
been decided. Some issues or facts with respect to the establishment of the arbitral 
tribunal’s jurisdiction merit special attention: 
First, in all but two cases (i.e., Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration 
(Bangladesh v. India) and the Atlanto-Scandian Herring Arbitration), controversies 
exist over the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Second, all the publically available Rules 
of Procedure grant the arbitral tribunal the right to deal with objections to its 
jurisdiction in accordance with Article 288(4) along with the right to determine 
whether the objection should be treated as a preliminary question.96 This gives the 
arbitral tribunal an edge in dealing with controversies over jurisdiction, and makes 
it more difficult for the parties to a dispute to raise any objection to jurisdiction. 
Third, in all decided cases except the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, objections to 
jurisdiction have not been treated as preliminary questions by the ITLOS or the 
arbitral tribunal, but assessed based on the claims of each party as a part of the 
arbitral procedure which has already been initiated. These objections have been, in 
most circumstances, decided in the final award. The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration is 
a special case, in which the arbitral tribunal made a specific Award on Jurisdiction 
in respect of Russia’s plea concerning jurisdiction before examining the merits 
of the dispute, despite Russia’s refusal to participate in and accept the arbitration 
procedure. Fourth, the arbitral tribunal’s prima facie jurisdiction over five of the 
decided cases was determined by the ITLOS.97 In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, 
the ITLOS first found that the arbitral tribunal had prima facie jurisdiction over the 
disputes, however the arbitral tribunal later decided that it did not have jurisdiction 
over the substantive problems of the disputes involved in the cases.98 The Southern 
96   See Article 11 of Rules of Procedure of The MOX Plant Case, Article 10 of Rules of 
Procedure of the Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Guyana v. Suriname), Article 10 of Rules 
of Procedure of the Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago), 
Article 10 of Rules of Procedure of the Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration 
(Bangladesh v. India), Article 11 of Rules of Procedure of the MPA Case, Article 13 
of Rules of Procedure of The “ARA Libertad” Arbitration, and Article 20 of Rules of 
Procedure of the South China Sea Arbitration.
97     The M/V “SAIGA” Case, The MOX Plant Case, Case concerning Land Reclamation, The 
“ARA Libertad” Arbitration and The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration.
98    Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Arbitral Tribunal, 
para. 62.
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Bluefin Tuna Cases, together with the three cases concerning the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries, constitute the four cases where the arbitral tribunal has truly 
and fully dealt with questions of its own jurisdiction. Fifth, in all cases the arbitral 
tribunal’s claimed jurisdiction or prima facie jurisdiction has been established. 
Except for the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, only one other case – the Arbitration 
between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago – is an instance where 
the applicant made new claims at the proceedings, over which the arbitral tribunal 
contended that it lacked jurisdiction. 
The arbitral practice indicates that when the arbitral tribunal and the ITLOS 
satisfy themselves that they have jurisdiction over the dispute, especially when the 
ITLOS establishes the arbitral tribunal’s (prima facie) jurisdiction, it has undergone 
a progressive process. Initially, the ITLOS verifies the requirements to which the 
parties have objected by primarily relying on the questioning and doubts raised by 
the parties, however, in accordance with Article 9 of Annex VII, the arbitral tribunal 
should “satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction” in a definitive sense. The standard 
that the arbitral tribunal adopts to establish its own jurisdiction should be positive 
and proactive. It would be limited to the standard used by the tribunal to refute 
the parties’ objection to its jurisdiction, which, however, is not enough to establish 
the tribunal’s jurisdiction. In the first two arbitrations concerning the delimitation 
of maritime boundaries, the arbitral tribunal gradually reached consensus, and 
the methods used to establish the tribunal’s jurisdiction were consistent with this 
standard. The tribunal has satisfied itself that it has jurisdiction over the disputes 
by demonstrating it fully in accordance with the “four requirements theory.”99 As 
emphasized by the arbitral tribunal in The MOX Plant Case, “the Tribunal must 
satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in a definitive sense.” Moreover, even to proceed 
to hear argument on the merits of the dispute brought before it, the tribunal “needs 
99       A complete account of jurisdiction over the dispute is also laid out in the Southern Bluefin 
Tuna Case. This case is the first instance of compulsory arbitration entertained fully 
in accordance with Annex VII of the UNCLOS. Nevertheless, the case was handled 
differently in comparison to subsequent cases, which may be related to the fact that the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes served as the Registry for the 
case. 
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to be satisfied at least that there are no substantial doubts as to its jurisdiction.”100
Certainly, the “four requirements theory” is coined by following an ordinary 
legal logic. In practice, due to the variance of the disputes involved in different 
cases, the arbitral tribunal’s analysis will accordingly put particular emphasis on 
various aspects. Nevertheless, the four requirements described herein should be 
complete. In accordance with Article 9, Annex VII to the UNCLOS, and the arbitral 
tribunal’s contentions in The MOX Plant Case, the question whether any one of the 
four requirements is satisfied should be answered in a clear manner. Viewed from 
the standard, the existing practices with respect to the Annex VII arbitral tribunal’s 
establishment of its jurisdiction are imperfect and problematic under certain 
circumstances.
In the South China Sea Arbitration, the arbitral tribunal issued its first 
Procedural Order in August 2013, in which the arbitral tribunal directed the 
Philippines to fully address the matters relating to the jurisdiction of the tribunal in 
its Memorial which should be submitted on 30 March 2014.101 This means that the 
Philippines is required to satisfy parties that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction, 
and the arbitral tribunal has, in a sense, transferred part of its responsibility to the 
Philippines, which is a relatively negative approach.102 The Philippines has since 
submitted its Memorial.103 Whatever efforts the Philippines has exerted in order 
to satisfy the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction, it cannot cancel the arbitral tribunal’s 
obligation to satisfy itself “that it has jurisdiction over the dispute”, pursuant to 
Article 9 of Annex VII and Article 25 of Rules of Procedure for the present case. In 
this regard, the arbitral tribunal in The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration made a 
100    The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Further Suspension of Proceedings 
on Jurisdiction and Merits, and Request for Further Provisional Measures, Order No. 3, 
Arbitral Tribunal Constituted pursuant to Article 287, and Article 1 of Annex VII, of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the Dispute concerning the MOX 
Plant, International Movements of Radioactive Materials, and the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the Irish Sea, 24 June 2003, p. 5, para. 15, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showpage.asp?pag_id=1148, 31 December 2014.
101      First Press Release, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1529, 31 December 
2014.
102    Due to the absence of an objection from China, the Philippines’ analysis may not 
be targeted. This may be beneficial to China. On the other hand, this also gives the 
Philippines greater room to address the issues according to its own understanding, which 
gives its standpoint a higher possibility that it will gain the support of the tribunal. 
103    At https://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/dfa-releases/2460-statement-
of-secretary-albert-f-del-rosario-on-the-submission-of-the-philippines-memorial-to-the-
arbitral-tribunal, 31 December 2014.
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good example by rendering an Award on Jurisdiction in respect of Russia’s plea 
concerning jurisdiction. It should be welcomed warmly if the arbitral tribunal of the 
present case follows the example.
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(Source of data: This table is prepared based on the data published on the 
web-sites of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showpage.asp?pag_id=1288; ITLOS, at http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=35; 
and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, at https://icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage
&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Archi
ve_%20Announcement7, 31 December 2014)
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